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A gradual buildup of neuronal activity known as the “readiness po-
tential” reliably precedes voluntary self-initiated movements, in the
average time locked tomovement onset. This buildup is presumed to
reﬂect the ﬁnal stages of planning and preparation for movement.
Here we present a different interpretation of the premovement
buildup.We used a leaky stochastic accumulator to model the neural
decision of “when” to move in a task where there is no speciﬁc
temporal cue, but only a general imperative to produce a movement
after an unspeciﬁed delay on the order of several seconds. According
to our model, when the imperative to produce a movement is weak,
the precise moment at which the decision threshold is crossed lead-
ing tomovement is largely determined by spontaneous subthreshold
ﬂuctuations in neuronal activity. Time locking to movement onset
ensures that these ﬂuctuations appear in the average as a gradual
exponential-looking increase in neuronal activity. Our model ac-
counts for thebehavioral and electroencephalography data recorded
from human subjects performing the task and also makes a speciﬁc
prediction that we conﬁrmed in a second electroencephalography
experiment: Fast responses to temporally unpredictable interrup-
tions should be preceded by a slow negative-going voltage deﬂec-
tion beginning well before the interruption itself, even when the
subject was not preparing to move at that particular moment.
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The role of ongoing spontaneous ﬂuctuations in neural activityhas been widely studied in the domain of perceptual decision
making (1–5), but their potential role in self-initiated movement
has been largely overlooked. This oversight probably arises be-
cause changes in neural activity that reliably precede the onset of
self-initiated movements are attributed de facto to speciﬁc
movement preparation, and thus the possibility that these might
reﬂect random ﬂuctuations simply never arises. The initiation of
spontaneous, uncued movements raises some unique questions:
If there is no external signal to trigger the movement, then what
in the brain is responsible for triggering the movement, and how
is the precise time of onset determined? These questions have
been raised in the past (6, 7), but the possible role of ongoing
spontaneous neural activity has not been considered.
The term bereitschaftspotential or “readiness potential” (RP)
refers to a slow buildup of electrical potential, measured using
electroencephalography (EEG), that reliably precedes self-initi-
atedmovements (8). Discovered in 1965 byKornhuber andDeecke
(8), the RP appears in the average over many data epochs time
locked to movement onset and may begin its negative deﬂection
one full second or more before movement onset (depending upon
the subject, task, and methods) (8–11). The RP is taken to be “the
electro-physiological sign of planning, preparation, and initiation of
volitional acts” (ref. 12, p. 14), echoing the widely held assumption
that the gradual increase in ﬁring rate and electrical potential that
precedes spontaneous movements does in fact reﬂect the goal-di-
rected operations that cause those movements. Surprisingly, more
than 40 y after the discovery of the RP, this assumption has only
recently been questioned (13, 14).
The premovement buildup of neuronal activity apparent in the
RP and the assumption of causality invested in it have become
a cornerstone in the study of volition. Notably, Benjamin Libet (9,
15) tried to measure the temporal relationship between the onset
of the RP and the feeling of an “urge” to move. The results of
Libet et al.’s experiments (9, 15) suggested that the objective
neural events in the brain that cause movement precede the urge
to move by 300 ms or more. A recent experiment, using Libet’s
paradigm, conﬁrms the same preurge buildup at the single-neuron
level (16). Such demonstrations have had an unrivaled inﬂuence
on the prevailing view that movement is initiated preconsciously
and the feeling of intending to move is grafted on after the fact.
In fact a gradual increase in neural activity preceding spon-
taneous movements appears to be a very general phenomenon,
common to both vertebrates (8, 16, 17) and invertebrates (18)
alike. Why do both humans and crayﬁsh (18) exhibit the same 1-
to 2-s buildup of neural activity in advance of self-initiated
movements? Kornhuber and Deecke’s (12) interpretation of the
RP as a sign of planning and preparation for movement fails to
explain what speciﬁc neural operations underlie the spontaneous
self-initiation of movement and why these operations are
reﬂected in the speciﬁc exponential shape of the RP.
Here we present a very different interpretation of mounting
neural activity preceding spontaneous movements made in the
context of a spontaneous-movement production task. Our model
shows that a decision threshold applied to autocorrelated noise—
in this case the output of a leaky stochastic accumulator—can
account for the speciﬁc shape of the RP as well as the distribution
of waiting times from subjects performing Libet et al.’s (9, 15)
spontaneous-movement task. We replicated Libet et al.’s (9) be-
havioral and EEG results and validated our model by ﬁtting the
shape of the RP, using parameters chosen by ﬁtting the behav-
ioral data. In addition, our model also directed us to a speciﬁc
prediction that we tested with a second EEG experiment.
Spontaneous Movement Tasks
Two different paradigms are prevalent in the literature on self-
initiated movement in humans. One is the paradigm of Korn-
huber and Deecke (8), and the other is the paradigm of Libet
et al. (9). These two paradigms are different in important ways,
although both reveal a readiness potential when the data are
time locked to movement onset or onset of EMG activity. In the
Kornhuber and Deecke (K&D) paradigm, subjects produce self-
paced movements at irregular intervals for periods of a few
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minutes at a time. Subjects are explicitly asked to avoid making
rhythmic movements and to vary the intervals between move-
ments. In studies that have used the K&D paradigm, subjects are
typically told to keep the intervals within certain limits (cf. ref.
19). For example, Kornhuber and Deecke (ref. 8, pp. 3–4) asked
subjects to “pause at least 15 seconds between movements, but
not more than about 25 seconds”; Ball et al. (20) asked subjects
to vary the interval between 12 and 24 s, and Jahanshahi et al.
(21) asked subjects to produce a movement once every 3 s on
average. Thus, the K&D paradigm often includes a time-interval
approximation task and therefore processes of time estimation
may be confounded with those speciﬁcally involved in self-initi-
ation of movement. Both motor timing and time-estimation tasks
have been associated with activation in some of the very same
regions that are associated with self-initiated or self-paced
movement, notably the supplementary motor area (SMA) and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) (22).
In Libet et al.’s (9) task, which we adopted here, subjects do
not repeatedly perform a movement at irregular intervals as in
the K&D task. Instead, there are discrete “trials,” with exactly
one movement per trial. Once the trial begins, there is a mini-
mum waiting interval of 3 s (indicated by a rotating clock dial on
the screen), and then the subject may make the instructed
movement spontaneously at any time. Subjects are speciﬁcally
instructed to not target a particular time interval or preplan the
time of their movement in any way. After the movement is made,
the subject recalls the approximate position of the clock dial at the
moment she or he ﬁrst was aware of the urge to move. Then the
subject waits for the next trial to begin.
Although our study is not concerned with the subjective urge
to move, we included the clock monitoring component for
completeness. The mean subjective urge to move that we report
from our experiment (−150 ms) is consistent with that of prior
studies (9, 16). The clock dial also ensures that subjects would
not need to rely on internal time-estimation mechanisms even if
they were basing their movement decisions on time elapsed.
We refer to the interval between the start of the trial and the
issuance of a movement as the “waiting time” (WT). Taken lit-
erally, Libet’s instructions allow the subject to wait an indeﬁnite
amount of time to produce a single movement. However, it is
implicit in the demand characteristics of the task that the subject
should not wait too long: The task is to produce a movement on
each trial, and the subject knows this. Thus, subjects rarely wait
longer than 20 s (ref. 16 and our data; Results).
The Stochastic-Decision Model and the Neural Decision to
Move
Human subjects are able to comply with the instruction to pro-
duce spontaneous movements, at seemingly random times, when
asked to do so (9, 16). We propose that the brain uses the same
machinery for decision making in this sort of task as it would in
any decision-making task: a threshold applied to the output of a
neural accumulator (23–25). This possibility is supported by a re-
cent study pointing to a common neural mechanism for voluntary
and stimulus-driven actions (26). Decision-making tasks are typ-
ically modeled in terms of the accumulation of evidence. What is
unique to the spontaneous-movement task is that subjects are
speciﬁcally instructed to not base their movement decisions on any
speciﬁc evidence, sensory or otherwise. One simple solution,
given these instructions, is to apply the same accumulator-plus-
threshold decision mechanism, but fed solely with internal phys-
iological noise. In our model this solution amounts to simply
shifting premotor activation up closer to the threshold for initia-
tion of the instructed movement and waiting for a random
threshold-crossing event. We refer to this as the stochastic-de-
cision model (Fig. 1A, Inset) and implement it using a leaky
stochastic accumulator process (27) with three parameters
(threshold, drift, and leak; Materials and Methods). Accumulator
models have been used extensively to characterize neural decision
making (23–25, 27). These processes produce autocorrelated time
series with a 1/f spectral proﬁle (1/f β, with β ∼ 2) similar to that
observed in human electrophysiology data (28).
The interpretation of premovement neural activity and its
relation to other phenomena depends critically on what we mean
when we refer to “the initiation of movement” in the brain—
a phrase that is often used and yet poorly deﬁned. In work on
perceptual decision making, the neural decision has been likened
to a commitment to a particular response (24) that corresponds
to the crossing of a sensory-motor threshold. We apply the same
logic to the spontaneous initiation of a speciﬁc movement (in the
absence of any immediate sensory cue) except that in this case
the decision is about when to move. Thus, in the context of our
model, the initiation of movement corresponds to a commitment
to perform a given movement now—a threshold-crossing event
that we refer to as the “neural decision to move now.” (This
event is conceptually distinct from the conscious decision to
move, which refers to the feeling of an urge or intention to move
that may or may not play a causal role.) Note that the neural
decision to inhibit (29) or veto (9) movement may intervene after
the “neural decision to move now.” Thus, we liken the “neural
decision to move now” to tipping over the ﬁrst in a row of
dominoes—it sets into motion a cascade that is ballistic, but not
deterministic (one could quickly remove the penultimate domino
before the cascade reaches it).
Our model is intended to account for the activity leading up to
the “neural decision to move now,” but not its immediate con-
sequences in motor cortex. We take the former to correspond to
the early phase of premovement activity, until ∼150 ms pre-
movement when the activity becomes lateralized (ref. 11 and our
data;Materials and Methods). Activity after that time is most likely
attributable to motor execution (30) rather than motor prepara-
tion. This time window also coincides with an abrupt increase in
cortico-spinal excitability in primary motor cortex (31) and with
subjective estimates of the time of a conscious urge tomove (9, 11).
Prediction Made by the Stochastic-Decision Model
One of the most important outstanding questions surrounding the
nature of the RP is, What is happening when there is no move-
ment (32)? Our model makes a speciﬁc prediction in this regard.
According to our view, the motor system constantly undergoes
covert ﬂuctuations that bring it closer to or farther from threshold.
These ﬂuctuations are ongoing throughout the epoch, far before
any actual speciﬁc motor response, thus sharply distinguishing our
view from the hypothesis of a ﬁxed set of goal-directed operations
occurring solely 1–2 s before an actual movement. We reasoned
that we should be able to capture these ongoing ﬂuctuations by
interrupting subjects with a compulsory response cue and sorting
trials by their reaction times. Assuming that the interrupted
responses arise from the same decision accumulator as the self-
initiated ones (26, 33), short response times should come pri-
marily from trials in which the spontaneous ﬂuctuations happened
to be already close to threshold at the time of the interruption.
Indeed, simulations show that when the model is interrupted at
random times and forced to produce a speeded response (Mate-
rials and Methods), the fastest responses are preceded by a slow
amplitude deﬂection (in the direction of the threshold) that long
precedes the interruption itself, whereas the slower responses are
not. Hence, even sensory-cued responses can be preceded by
a readiness potential.
Thus, we predicted that the subject’s fastest responses to un-
predictable interruptions would be preceded by a signiﬁcantly
higher-amplitude negative-going voltage trend compared with
the subject’s slow responses—at the same sensors that exhibit the
readiness potential. If the difference were to reﬂect a mounting
preparation to move that was building over the course of the
entire trial [i.e., the “contingent negative variation” (CNV)] (34),
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then one would predict that fast responses would tend to happen
relatively late in the trial compared with slow responses. How-
ever, if the difference were to reﬂect ongoing spontaneous
ﬂuctuations, then one would expect slow and fast reactions to be
distributed equally across time within trials.
To test this empirically we devised a variant of Libet et al.’s (9,
15) task that we refer to as Libetus interruptus. Recall that in
Libet et al.’s (9) task (henceforth the classic task), the subject
monitors a quickly rotating clock dial and on each trial makes a
single speciﬁc movement, spontaneously, at an arbitrary mo-
ment, without preplanning. The Libetus interruptus task is
identical to the classic Libet task except for the addition of
random interruptions: an audible “click” that cues the subject to
make the movement immediately, as quickly as possible (in our
experiment the movement was a button press made with the
thumb of the dominant hand; Materials and Methods). Each trial
ends when the subject either makes the movement spontaneously
or is interrupted. Subjects were encouraged not to make any
effort to avoid the interruptions, but to simply do as they had
done previously in the classic task. By interrupting subjects at
unpredictable times we set out to reveal the spontaneous brain
activity that might also play a role in the onset of self-initiated
movements in this task.
Results
Subjects completed 50 trials of the classic Libet task and then
three blocks (150 trials in total) of the Libetus interruptus task.
The mean subjective estimate of the time of the conscious urge
to move (classic task) was 152 ms premovement (±33 ms SEM),
consistent with previous reports (9, 11). The majority of subjects
exhibited a readiness potential in the classic Libet task. In two
subjects, the readiness potential (a negative-going voltage de-
ﬂection before movement onset) could not be identiﬁed from the
available EEG sensors, and these subjects were excluded from
further EEG analyses.
We ﬁrst tested the ability of the proposed drift-diffusion
model to account for the distribution of behavioral WTs in the
classic Libet task. When the data are pooled across subjects, the
Poisson-like shape of the WT distribution is consistent with
a prior replication of Libet’s task (16) (Fig. 1B, Inset). Pooling
the data, however, confounds variance within and variance be-
tween subjects. When each subject’s distribution was normalized
to its mean, the average distribution across subjects (Fig. 1B)
showed the broad, rightward skewed shape typical of response-
time distributions. We searched for parameters (threshold, leak,
and drift) that best ﬁt the empirical WT distribution from the
classic Libet task and obtained an excellent ﬁt (Fig. 1B). Also,
the SD of reaction time is known to scale linearly with the mean
in a wide range of response-time tasks, and this relationship is
also true of the ﬁrst crossing times in a drift-diffusion process
(35). We veriﬁed that this relationship also held for the speciﬁc
model and parameters that we used (Fig. 2A). Our empirical
waiting-time data from the classic task also exhibited a clear
linear relationship between the mean and SD across subjects (r =
0.9, P < 0.00001; Fig. 2B). This result counts as an additional
validation of the model and further reinforces our claim that the
same mechanisms involved in generating motor responses are at
work in reaction-time tasks and the Libet task.
Using the very same model parameters derived from ﬁtting the
behavioral data, we then attempted to ﬁt the shape of the early
part of the empirical RP (−3 to −0.15 s), with the average over
all of the ﬂuctuating time series produced by the model, time-
locked to threshold crossing. Again we obtained an excellent ﬁt
(r2 = 0.96, P < 10−9; Fig. 1C). This result is a nontrivial valida-
tion of the model, because nearby parameters yielded a poorer ﬁt
to the RP than the ones chosen by ﬁtting to the WT distribution
(Fig. S1).
We then analyzed the behavioral and EEG data from the
interruptus experiment. First, we veriﬁed that the insertion of
interruptions did not dramatically distort the self-initiated
movement task. The mean RPs and waiting-time distributions
for self-initiated responses in the classic Libet and interruptus
experiments are compared in Fig. 3. Introducing random inter-
ruptions did not have any measurable effect on the shape of the
mean RP on noninterrupted trials for either the model-gener-
ated or the empirical RPs (Fig. 3). Second, to test the main
prediction described earlier, we focused on the trials in which the
subject was interrupted by a click, grouping these trials according
to whether the response time to the click was slow or fast (upper
and lower third of reaction times, respectively, for each subject).
Recall that the model predicted that fast responses to clicks
would tend to be preceded by a slow negative-going voltage
Fig. 1. The stochastic-decision model reproduces the distribution of waiting times as well as the characteristic shape and time course of the readiness po-
tential. (A) Visual depiction of the model: After a stochastic exponential transition period, determined by the ratio of urgency and leak parameters, the leaky
accumulator generates noisy trajectories whose threshold crossings determine movement times. When the threshold is crossed (t0), we extract an “epoch”
centered on t0 and then reset the accumulator to zero and start the next trial. The “waiting time” is the time from trial onset to threshold crossing, and the
“RP” is the average over all of the simulated epochs (sign reversed) time locked to threshold crossing. The shaded thick line in the foreground shows the mean
trajectory over 1,000 simulated trials. (B) Mean waiting-time distribution (normalized to the mean for each subject) from the empirical data (shaded line) and
the best ﬁt of the output of the simulation (dashed solid line). Inset shows the distribution when the data from all subjects are pooled together (for com-
parison with ref. 16). (C) Mean empirical RP from the classic Libet task (minus the mean from −3.0 to −2.5 s; shaded line; n = 14) and the mean sign-reversed
output of the simulation ﬁt to the time range −3.0 to −0.15 s (r2 = 0.96, P < 10−9). To avoid overﬁtting, the parameters of the model (threshold, drift, and leak)
were chosen on the basis of the best ﬁt to the empirical waiting-time distribution, and then those same parameters were used to ﬁt the RP (C) and for all
other analyses.
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deﬂection beginning well before the click itself (Fig. 4 E and F).
This prediction was conﬁrmed by the data (Fig. 4 A–D). When
the data were time locked to the onset of movement, the mean
difference in signal amplitude (fast minus slow) over the last 500
ms before the approximate time of the click (−0.8 to −0.3 s
premovement) was signiﬁcantly less than zero (P < 0.005, two-
sided signed rank test; Fig. 4 A and C). When the data were time
locked to the click, the difference was signiﬁcantly less than zero
(P < 0.005, two-sided signed rank test) over the last 500 ms
before the click (−0.5 to −0.0 s preclick; Fig. 4 B and D).
Presumably the increased (negative) electrical potential pre-
ceding faster responses cannot reﬂect speciﬁc preparatory neural
activity, because the clicks were unpredictable. However, to rule
out coincidental movement preparation as an explanation, we
instructed subjects to say the word “coincidence” if the click
should ever happen just as they were about to move, or were
actually performing the movement, and these trials, although
rare, were excluded (4% of trials on average). Preconscious
preparation can also be ruled out as an explanation because such
coincidences would also be quite rare (similar to the frequency of
conscious coincidences) and thus would have to be extreme
outliers to account for the effect. We excluded trials where the
mean EEG amplitude from −500 to −200 ms before movement
onset (in response to a click) was different from the median by
more than two times the interquartile range, individually for each
subject/response speed. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the
fast responses were fast because of speciﬁc movement preparation
(conscious or unconscious) coincident with the click. [One could
argue that preconscious motor preparation is happening more
often than once in a given trial, thus invalidating our argument.
Apart from the fact that this essentially is our argument (with
“motor preparation” replaced by “spontaneous ﬂuctuations”),
according to Libet et al. (9), these would have to be consciously
aborted by the subject for them to not produce movements.
Subjects were interviewed after the experiment and none reported
using a strategy of repeatedly aborting movements about to oc-
cur.] Another alternative explanation for the effect is that fast
responses to clicks might tend to happen later in the trial when the
subject is behaviorally more primed for movement and that the
preclick negativity reﬂects a general readiness to move that was
building over the course of the trial (i.e., the CNV) (34). This
buildup in readiness would predict a tendency for fast responses to
happen later in the trial. Although there does appear to be
a general negative trend preceding both fast and slow responses
(Fig. 4 A and B), this trend cannot account for the difference be-
tween the signals preceding fast- and slow-click RTs: An analysis
Fig. 2. (A and B) Linear relationship between mean and SD of (A) threshold crossing times in the simulation and (B) empirical waiting times in the classic Libet
task. This relationship is predicted by the drift-diffusion model and by data from reaction-time tasks (35). The values in A were obtained by varying the
urgency parameter from 0.06 to 0.22 in steps of 0.02, while keeping the other parameters (leak and threshold) ﬁxed at the values selected by ﬁtting to the WT
distribution (Fig. 1B). The presence of this relationship is evidence that the same mechanism (bounded integration) thought to be involved in perceptual
decision-making tasks is also at work in a spontaneous movement task.
Fig. 3. Readiness potential and waiting-time distribution from the classic Libet and interruptus paradigms. (A and B) The black traces show the mean RP from
the classic Libet paradigm and the red traces show the RP from noninterrupted trials of the interruptus paradigm, for the simulated (A) and empirical (B) data,
respectively. Insets show the distribution of waiting times for the classic (black) and interruptus (red) paradigms. The truncated distribution from the classic
experiment is shown in B (gray) for comparison with that obtained from the interruptus experiment. There were no signiﬁcant differences between the RPs
from the two paradigms, in either the simulated or the empirical data. The empirical waiting-time distribution from the interruptus task (B, Inset, red line)
differs from that predicted (B, Inset, gray line) for shorter waiting times (<8 s), because some subjects changed their behavior during this task, tending to
make their movements earlier on average. No baseline correction was applied in B.
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of the distribution of preclick waiting times for slow and fast
responses to clicks shows that these times were distributed equally
throughout the time span of the trial (P = 0.64, paired-samples
two-sided signed rank test, n = 13; Fig. S2).
We also examined the distribution of waiting times for spon-
taneous movements in each condition (Fig. 3, Insets). If subjects
were able to comply with the experimenter’s instruction to avoid
trying to “beat the clock” (i.e., trying to always make a sponta-
neous movement before a click happens), then the waiting-time
distribution should simply be a truncated version of the distri-
bution in the classic Libet task. For each subject we computed
the estimated waiting-time distribution for the interruptus task as
the product of the distribution in the classic Libet task and the
cumulative distribution of interruption times. The estimated
truncated distribution closely matched part of the empirical
distribution obtained for the interruptus task (Fig. 3B, Inset), but
the empirical distribution showed a higher incidence of relatively
short waiting times than predicted, meaning that some subjects
altered their behavior by initiating movements earlier on average
in the presence of interruptions.
As with any model, there are likely to be factors that are rel-
evant to the empirical observations, but are not accounted for
(explicitly or implicitly) in the model. For example, the model
treats each trial as completely independent of the one before it—
Fig. 4. Libetus Interruptus experiment. (A) Premovement potential (from the same electrode, near the vertex, as the RP) for fast (orange) and slow (gray)
responses to clicks (intermediate responses were similar to fast responses, being only slightly lower in amplitude during the preclick interval). All graded error
boundaries extend out to 95% conﬁdence. (C) Difference between fast and slow responses. The black asterisks at the top mark time points where the
difference is signiﬁcant (P < 0.01, two-sided signed-rank test). (B and D) Same as A and C, except that the data are time locked to the click rather than to the
movement. We propose that the faster responses (top 33rd percentile) were faster because ongoing spontaneous activity was closer to threshold at the time
of the interruption. When time locked to the click, an auditory evoked potential is evident (B), but this potential is canceled out in the difference (D). Because
the variance in reaction times to the click was relatively small (subjects were asked to respond as quickly as possible), a diluted auditory evoked potential is
also visible when the data are time locked to the movement (A). The weaker and inverted evoked potential in the difference between fast and slow responses
time locked to the movement (C) is due to the difference in reaction time (i.e., delay between click and movement) for slow vs. fast responses (the auditory
evoked potentials fail to completely cancel out as they do in D, where the data were time locked to the click). (E and F) Results of the simulation, time locked
to threshold crossing (E) and time locked to the interruption (F). A speeded response was simulated by introducing a steep linear ramp at the time of the
random interruption, which is visible at the end of each trace. Interruption times were chosen randomly from a uniform distribution extending from the
minimum to the maximum of the WT distribution, just as was done in the experiment. In roughly half of simulated trials the output crossed the threshold
before the interruption occurred, and these were treated as “spontaneous movement” trials. For details of the model, see Materials and Methods. For A
and B the data for each subject were normalized to the overall mean and SD in the time range −2.5 to −0.3 s (A) or −2.5–0 s (B) to remove between-
subject variance.
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there is no memory between trials. However, empirically we
observed a clear relationship (positive correlation) between the
waiting times in trials t and t − 1 (Fig. S3). This relationship
could arise in the model if the threshold showed slow auto-
correlated ﬂuctuations. We also found that subjects showed a small
but systematic preference for making movements at the “bot-
tom” of the clock, i.e., roughly between “15” and “45” on the
clock, independent of the number of cycles (Fig. S4). These two
observations are likely to reﬂect automatisms, although strategic
factors, such as an intentional effort on the part of subjects to
produce a “random” distribution of movement times with re-
spect to the clock dial, cannot be excluded. These factors could
be incorporated into a future model, but it is important to note
that the model was able to account for the data quite well with
only three free parameters.
Discussion
The origin of self-initiated movement is a multifaceted question,
and there are numerous different contexts in which spontaneous
self-initiated movements may arise: the initiation of foraging or
grooming behaviors, adjusting one’s position after having been
seated for awhile, and even musical improvisation. The various
factors involved and possible remote causes of movement initi-
ation in these different contexts could be as varied as the con-
texts themselves, and the brain mechanisms involved might be
equally diverse. Our study concerns events in the brain near the
end of the causal chain leading to self-initiated movement, in the
last 1 or 2 s before movement onset, in a context where a single
speciﬁc movement is to be made “spontaneously” at an arbitrary
unspeciﬁed time. Our model is intended to account for (i) the
shape of the premovement buildup in neural activity that is
known to precede spontaneous self-initiated movements made in
this context and (ii) the distribution of waiting times observed in
this context. A plethora of phenomena surround self-initiation of
movement and our model is not intended to account for all of
them. However, our model is conceptually sufﬁcient to account
for the two phenomena listed above, and it is empirically sufﬁ-
cient to account for our behavioral and EEG data.
A large body of work, spanning more than four decades, has
examined the properties of the readiness potential: its temporal
proﬁle, topography at different latencies, variability in different
task contexts and disease states, potential cortical “generators,”
and even its relevance to “free will” (36, 37). However, we still
lack a precise mechanistic account of what the RP reﬂects, be-
yond descriptive phrases such as “planning and preparation for
movement.” Here we have offered such an account—in terms of
ongoing spontaneous ﬂuctuations in neural activity, a neural
accumulator, and a threshold—that is both plausible and parsi-
monious. Our account departs from the prevailing assumptions
about the nature of the RP and thus suggests that some very
basic questions be revisited from a different perspective.
For example, there is a lack of consensus in the ﬁeld on how
best to divide the RP into separate partially overlapping quasi-
linear phases (37), each associated with a distinct cortical gener-
ator. By contrast, according to ourmodel, the RP can be described
in terms of two nonlinear components: an early precommitment
phase dominated by stochastic ﬂuctuations (with an evolving
spatial distribution) and a late postcommitment motor-execution
phase (the last 150 ms). Also, the notion of an unconscious slow
buildup of activity biasing supposedly “voluntary” decisions has
been demonstrated in prior studies (38, 39). Our model is con-
sistent with such predecision biases, but suggests that they may
reﬂect stochastic ﬂuctuations rather than an intentional (pre-
conscious) decision process.
It is widely assumed that the neural decision to move coincides
with the onset of the RP (which, given its slow nonlinear char-
acter, is difﬁcult to pinpoint) (11). Our model challenges that
assumption by suggesting that the “neural decision to move now”
might come very late in the time course of the RP. Prior research
shows an involvement of motor areas, including primary motor
cortex, in motor imagery, in the absence of overt movement (40).
Thus, movement-speciﬁc activity in motor cortex, even primary
motor cortex, although it might vary with the probability that
a movement will occur, does not necessarily signal the ﬁnal
commitment to produce a movement now. In addition, a recent
study shows that the dynamics of an evolving decision process
can be “read out” from activity in the motor system even before
the decision threshold has been crossed, further supporting our
claim that the early phase of the RP might reﬂect a predecision
rather than a postdecision buildup (33).
We propose that the neural decision to move corresponds to
a commitment to produce a movement now and that this com-
mitment is associated with a threshold crossing of the accumu-
lator underlying the response decision (33), a lateralization of
the premovement potential (11), and an abrupt increase in ex-
citability in primary motor cortex ∼100 ms before the onset of
muscle ﬂexion (31) (or ∼150 ms before the button press, for the
hardware that we used). We propose that the precise time of the
“neural decision to move now” is partly determined by sponta-
neous ﬂuctuations that are temporally autocorrelated.
Temporal autocorrelation is a well-known characteristic of
spontaneous neural activity at both macroscopic (41–44) and
microscopic (45–49) scales and can explain why evidence-based
neural decisions are partially predictable even before the evidence
is provided (50). A backward selection bias (only epochs ending
with an actual movement are subject to analysis) ensures that the
spontaneous ﬂuctuations that contributed to the threshold
crossing are recovered in the average (8, 9) or in the probability of
classifying a small segment of data as coming from early or late in
the epoch (ref. 16 and Fig. S5). It also guarantees that the se-
quence of neural events necessary for producing a movement, no
matter how complex it may be, will be reﬂected in the data (be-
cause a movement did in fact occur at the end of each epoch).
Thus, according to our model, uncued movements in a task like
Libet’s tend to be preceded by a gradual increase in neural activity
[measured at the scalp (8, 9) or the single-neuron level (16)]
whose causal role is incidental—not directed (consciously or
otherwise) at producing a movement.
The goal in each trial in Libet’s task is to produce a movement
at an unspeciﬁed moment sometime in the near future. We pro-
pose that this goal is effected by setting up circumstances (moving
baseline premotor activation up closer to threshold) that favor the
spontaneous initiation of a movement at some moment in the
near future. However, the precise moment is not directly decided
by a goal-directed operation—it is determined stochastically by
ongoing spontaneous ﬂuctuations in neural activity.
In an attempt to capture the contribution of ongoing sponta-
neous brain activity to unplanned movements, we introduced
random interruptions with speeded responses into Libet et al.’s
(9) classic paradigm. Our primary prediction was that fast
responses to interruptions (an auditory click) would tend to be
preceded by a gradual negative-going voltage deﬂection: If the
motor cortex is already somewhat closer to the threshold for
movement at the time that the interruption occurs, then the
movement will be initiated more quickly in response. By contrast,
the widely held view of the RP as a sequence of speciﬁc compu-
tations preceding a self-initiated movement does not predict
a similar buildup before an unexpected response cue.
Prestimulus activity has previously been shown to inﬂuence
reaction time in a choice reaction-time task (30). Our data show
that the same is also true for unpredictable movement cues in
a temporally unconstrained task, thus exposing ongoing sponta-
neous neural activity as a possible factor in the initiation of
spontaneous movement. [A similar idea was once proposed (ref.
51, cited in ref. 52), but was ignored because it was dualist.]
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Spontaneous subthreshold membrane potential ﬂuctuations
have been shown to inﬂuence spike times (53) and spontaneous
neural activity has been shown to inﬂuence the time of percep-
tual transitions (54). Our study shows that there may also be
a speciﬁc interaction with the onset time of spontaneous move-
ment. However, although our study demonstrates that the
readiness potential could reﬂect non–goal-directed (spontane-
ous) neural activity, it does not prove that this possibility is in fact
the case. Further research will be required to conﬁrm this.
Hughes et al. (26) also interrupted subjects while they prepared
to make a movement. However, their subjects were trained to
produce a movement no sooner than 1200 ms and no later than
2000 ms after trial onset. Thus, although the choice of which
movement to make (left hand or right hand) was left to the sub-
ject, the choice of when to move was highly constrained—and,
importantly, it was constrained to within the characteristic time-
scale of the RP (roughly 0.5–2.5 s). In similar work on monkeys
(6, 7), also involving interruptions, waiting times were also well
within the characteristic timescale of the RP and trials were short
(mean waiting time of ∼2.5 s) and always ended in a movement.
Thus, effects of premovement neural activity on stimulus reaction
time in these studies can be attributed to speciﬁc goal-directed
motor preparation.
Although the implicit demand characteristics of Libet’s task
(the paradigm to which we added random interruptions) ensure
that subjects typically will not wait more than ∼20 s before
producing a movement, the typical waiting times in our experi-
ment (roughly 5–20 s) were considerably longer than the char-
acteristic timescale of the RP. This span of waiting times allows
us to attribute pre-interruption variability in the EEG signal to
spontaneous ﬂuctuations that are ongoing during such a task,
having accounted for other factors such as urgency and co-
incidental motor preparation. Given that such spontaneous
ﬂuctuations are always present (55), even when we are not even
thinking about moving, is it reasonable to conclude that the brain
“decided” to move 2 s before the threshold crossing? We suggest
reserving the term “decision” to the commitment to move ach-
ieved once neural activity (spontaneous or goal directed) crosses
a speciﬁc threshold. Libet et al.’s (9) ﬁndings were surprising
because they suggested that the neural decision to move happens
well before we are aware of the urge to move, by 1/2 s or more.
According to our model, this conclusion is unfounded. The
reason we do not experience the urge to move as having hap-
pened earlier than about 200 ms before movement onset is
simply because, at that time, the neural decision to move
(crossing the decision threshold) has not yet been made. A very
similar ﬂuctuation in neuronal ﬁring could equally well, at some
other time, have not preceded a movement.
The connection between spontaneous ﬂuctuations in neural
activity and self-initiated movement can be generalized to real-
world settings. Consider the simple act of reaching for a cup of
coffee while reading the newspaper. If you set the cup of coffee
within reach with the idea of drinking it, then sooner or later you
will probably reach for it and take the next sip. However, why did
you reach for it at the precise moment that you did and not, e.g.,
500 ms earlier or later? One can extend this idea to choice
behaviors such as choosing between reaching for a coffee cup or
reaching for a mufﬁn. If you are somewhat hungry and also
somewhat thirsty, then spontaneous ﬂuctuations might play
a role in tipping the scales in favor of one or the other, as is the
case with cued perceptual decisions (56). This notion might also
help in understanding behavioral traits such as impulsivity, which
can be predicted in individuals on the basis of a measure of long-
range dependency (the Hurst exponent) applied to spontaneous
ﬂuctuations in brain activity (44).
Our model may also help to resolve certain puzzling questions,
like the one posed in the introductory section: Why do both
humans and crayﬁsh (18) exhibit the same ∼2-s buildup of neural
activity in advance of self-initiated movements? According to our
model, all that is necessary is that the temporal autocorrelation
present in spontaneous neuronal ﬂuctuations (characterized by
the 1/f exponent) be highly conserved across the animal kingdom,
which appears to be the case (49). Just as in our model, if the
precise onset time of a bout of foraging on the part of a crayﬁsh
is partly determined by spontaneous ﬂuctuations, then these
ﬂuctuations are likely to be recovered in the average time locked
to movement onset. Our model might also help to explain why
the RP has not proved to be a particularly robust predictor in the
development of asynchronous brain–computer interfaces (BCIs)
(57–59): We assume that spontaneous ﬂuctuations are ongoing
even when the subject is not preparing to move and that these
can often approach the threshold without crossing it. Therefore,
false alarms will be a limiting factor in the overall sensitivity of an
interface that uses slow ﬂuctuations to infer movement intention.
[There are two broad classes of brain–computer interface, syn-
chronous and asynchronous. Synchronous BCI applications use
a priori knowledge of the time of the event, e.g., by cueing the
subject to form an intention. The BCI then examines the data in
a small temporal window beginning with the cue and tries to
determine what the intention is (e.g., “move the cursor left” or
“move the cursor right”). By contrast, an asynchronous, or self-
paced, BCI continuously monitors the signal streaming from the
sensors and has to detect when the intention has emerged (and
possibly what as well) and then trigger some external event (60).]
Finally, although our model is silent with respect to the urge to
move and its temporal relation to motor decisions, it helps dis-
solve another puzzling question that seemed to arise from Libet’s
paradigm. Libet himself found that subjects were able to esti-
mate the time of a tactile sensory decision in relation to a quickly
rotating clock dial with only about 50 ms of error on average (9).
Why then should there be such a long and variable gap between
the time of a motor decision and the subjective estimate of the
time of the motor decision, whereas no such gap exists for sen-
sory decisions? In fact, this question arises only when we assume
that the motor decision coincides in time with the onset of the
RP. We have argued that this need not be the case and that
the neural decision to move may come much closer in time to the
movement itself (e.g., −150 ms). We propose that the neural
decision to move coincides in time with average subjective esti-
mates of the time of awareness of intention to move (9, 11) and
that the brain produces a reasonably accurate estimate of the
time of its movement-causing decision events.
Materials and Methods
Subjects. A total of 16 subjects participated in the experiment (6 females,
mean age 28 y, 1 left handed). All had normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity. Subjects were recruited from the surrounding community and nearby
universities, and all subjects gavewritten informed consent to participate and
were paid for their participation. Two subjects did not exhibit a negative
trend in voltage (at Cz or any adjacent electrode) beforemovement onset and
so were excluded from all EEG analyses. One subject completed only the
classic Libet task. So for the classic Libet task, n = 14, and for the interruptus
task, n = 13. For behavioral analyses comparing behavior between the two
tasks, n = 15.
Stimuli and Task. Visual stimuli were back-projected onto a translucent
viewing screen positioned ∼60 cm in front of the subject’s eyes (Panasonic
DLP projector, model PT-D7700E-K, 60 Hz refresh rate). The stimulus was
a circular clock dial (white on a black background) with a small ﬁxation cross
in the center. The diameter of the clock dial subtended ∼6° of viewing angle.
A small white circle (∼0.3° in diameter) moved along the inner edge of the
clock dial, making one cycle every 3 s (as in ref. 9). Stimuli were presented
using E-Prime (PST Software). A ﬁve-button ﬁber-optic response bar (Cam-
bridge Research Systems) was held in the dominant hand. The subject cra-
dled the bar with the ﬁngers and pressed the topmost button with the
thumb. The hand rested comfortably in the subject’s lap or on a tabletop in
front of the subject (according to the subject’s preference). The experi-
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menter sat outside of the shielded room and communicated with the subject
via an intercom.
Each session began with a 5-min resting-state recording (part of a separate
experiment). After this recording the subject performed 50 trials of the
classic Libet task and then 150 trials of the interruptus task (three rounds of
50 trials each), in that order. Instructions for the interruptus task were
explained to the subject only after the classic Libet task had been completed.
The only difference between the two tasks was the possibility of inter-
ruptions in the latter task (a nonaversive auditory “pip” played through an
EEG-compatible earphone). In all other respects the trial sequence was the
same for the two tasks.
Classic Libet Task. Each trial beganwith the appearance of theﬁxation cross at
the center of the screen. The experimenter would press a key on the stimulus
computer keyboard, causing the clock face to appear. The subject would then
initiate the trial by pressing the button, at which point the dot would appear
and begin (starting at the top of the clock) to circle the clock face. Subjects
were instructed to wait for one full cycle on the clock and then, at any time
after that, to press the button. Subjects were instructed to maintain the
thumb relaxed and in contact with the button throughout the entire trial (i.e.,
to not lift the thumb just before pressing the button) and to make one single
abrupt ﬂexion of the thumb at an unspeciﬁed time. Subjects were told to try
not to decide or plan in advance when to press the button, but to make the
event as spontaneous and capricious as possible. Subjects were reminded
that, after the ﬁrst cycle of the dot around the clock face, the movement
could be made at any time. Despite this, no subject ever waited longer than
30 s to produce a movement.
After the subject pressed the button, the dot would continue to circle the
clock for 1 s and then the screen would go blank. The subject would then
indicate, verbally, the approximate position of the dot at the time that she or
he was ﬁrst aware of the urge to press the button (subjects were reminded
that this is not the same as indicating the time of the movement itself, and
we made sure that they understood the difference). [Libet’s method for
measuring the onset of felt urges has been criticized (61), but is irrelevant to
this experiment, which concerns only the initiation of movement. We nev-
ertheless report these data, for completeness.] The experimenter would
then verbally repeat the number back to the subject for veriﬁcation and
note the time alongside the trial number in a log book (these were later
entered manually onto a computer spreadsheet, alongside the trial in-
formation exported from E-Prime). The experimenter would then press a key
to initiate the next trial.
Libetus Interruptus Task. The instructions for the interruptus task were given
only after the subject completed the classic task. Subjects were told that they
were to repeat the same task as before and were given the following ad-
ditional instructions (in French): “At any time during a trial you might hear
a brief click. If you hear the click, then you should press the button imme-
diately, as quickly as possible. The trial ends when you either make a spon-
taneous movement or are interrupted by a click, whichever happens ﬁrst.”
Subjects were reminded to make the movement as spontaneous as possible
and were also reminded that the task is not a race to press the button before
the click—the experimenter has no preference for “click trials” or “sponta-
neous-movement trials” (cf. ref. 7).
For the interruptus task, random interruptions were scheduled (by the
computer software) forevery trial. In sometrials the subjectmadea self-initiated
movement before the scheduled interruption, and in some trials the subject
was interrupted before making a self-initiated movement. The time of inter-
ruptions was selected randomly from a uniform distribution with the range
being selected to encompass the subject’s waiting-time distribution from the
preceding session. The lowendof the rangewas never earlier than100ms (“10”
on the clock) after the ﬁrst clock cycle, to avoid extremely early interruptions.
The precise range over which interruption times were randomly selected was
recorded for each round for each subject, and these ranges were used for the
ﬁtting of each subject’s waiting-time distribution and to derive the predicted
waiting-time distribution for the interruptus task (Fig. 3B). The use of a Poisson
distribution would have ensured that subjects could not use elapsed time to
predict the probability of an interruption. However, this method would also
have resulted in a preponderance of early interruptions and may have been
more likely to incite subjects to rush their responses to beat the clock. Also
this method would have resulted in the time of interruptions being biased to-
ward the early part of the trial. Thus, we opted for a uniform distribution.
EEG Recording. EEG signals were recorded inside a shielded chamber at
a sampling rate of 1,000 Hz (Elekta NeuroMag EEG/MEG system), while the
subject performed the tasks. The subject wore a 60-channel EEG cap (Elekta
NeuroMag ) and sat in a reclined position. To shorten the EEG preparation
time, we used a subset of the 60 electrodes, encompassing the standard 10–20
montage, with the addition of C1, C2, FC1, and FC2. We endeavored to keep
impedances below 10 kOhm, while being mindful of any reported discom-
fort during the preparation. Electrooculograms (EOG) (horizontal and ver-
tical) and electromyograms (EMG) (ﬂexor pollicis longus muscle) were also
recorded, using pairs of electrodes connected to bipolar recording channels.
Time locking to the rectiﬁed, high-pass–ﬁltered EMG signal did not notice-
ably change the results, but only shifted them ∼50 ms forward in time. Be-
cause EMG data were unavailable for three subjects (due to excess hair on
the arm or an electrode coming loose) and were unreliable for a fourth, we
chose to time lock to the button press.
EEG Data Analysis. Data analysis was performed using MatLab (MathWorks)
with the help of the FieldTrip toolbox for MatLab (http://ﬁeldtrip.fcdonders.
nl/). A dedicated trigger channel was used to insert temporal markers in the
data, corresponding to trial onset, button press, and auditory interruptions.
Data epochs were time locked to the ﬁrst button press after trial onset
(whether spontaneous or in response to an interruption) and epochs cov-
ered the time window from −3.5 s to +1.0 s relative to that event. For time
locking to interruptions, the trigger pulse corresponding to the auditory pip
was located within the epoch, and the whole epoch was realigned to this
sample. Independent component analysis (ICA) was used to remove ocular
artifacts from the data (62). Ocular ICA components were identiﬁed by visual
inspection and comparison with the EOG signals. Trials with artifacts
remaining after this procedure were excluded by visual inspection. Because
we were interested in slow ﬂuctuations, no detrending, baseline correction,
or hi-pass ﬁltering was performed. Data were downsampled to 250 Hz
during preprocessing, before data analysis.
Due to anatomical differences between subjects, variation in the posi-
tioning of the electrode cap, and the fact that our EEG caps came in three
discrete sizes, it is unlikely that any given electrode will be optimally placed to
record the RP in all subjects. Most subjects exhibited an RP at electrode Cz and
one or more adjacent electrodes, especially contralateral to the dominant
hand (used to perform the task), but the center of the spatial distribution
varied from subject to subject. Therefore, for each subject we selected an
electrode fromCz, C1, or FC1 (Cz, C2, or FC2 if left handed) on the basis of data
from the classic task, showing the highest-amplitude RP. This same electrode
was then used for analysis of the data from the interruptus task (so the choice
of electrode used in Fig. 3 was independent of the data presented in Fig. 3).
Limiting the choice to C1 (C2) or FC1 (FC2) did not change the outcome.
Model and Simulations. All simulations were performed using MatLab
(MathWorks). The model includes two components: a leaky stochastic accu-
mulator (with a threshold on its output) and a time-locking/epoching pro-
cedure. We used a well-known accumulator model (DDM) (27), which is an
extension of an earlier model developed by Ratcliff (23). Simulation of the
model amounts to iterative numerical integration of the differential equation
δxi ¼ ðI−kxiÞΔt þ cξi
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Δt
p
; [1]
where I is drift rate, k is leak (exponential decay in x), ξ is Gaussian noise, and
c is a noise-scaling factor (we used c = 0.1). Δt is the discrete time step used in
the simulation (we used Δt = 0.001). In the context of our model, I corre-
sponds to a general (and we assume constant) urgency to respond that is
inherent in the demand characteristics of the task. A small amount of ur-
gency is necessary in the model to account for the fact that subjects rarely if
ever wait longer than ∼20 s to produce a movement in any given trial. Be-
cause of the leak term, the urgency does not set up a linear trajectory to-
ward the threshold (i.e., if we were to increase the threshold that we used by
a factor of 2, the output of the accumulator would essentially never reach
it), but simply moves the baseline level of activity closer to the threshold so
that a crossing is very likely to happen soon (Fig. 1, Inset).
Thus, the model has three free parameters, urgency (I), leak (k), and
threshold (β). The threshold was expressed as a percentile of the output
amplitude over a set of 1,000 simulated trials (50,000 time steps each). These
three parameters were chosen on the basis of the best ﬁt of the ﬁrst
crossing-time distribution to the empirical waiting-time distribution from the
classic Libet task (we use the term “waiting time” instead of “reaction time”).
The parameters were then ﬁxed at these values for all other simulations and
analyses, including the ﬁtting of the RP. The three parameter values assigned
were k = 0.5, I = 0.11, and β = 0.298 (corresponding to the 80th percentile).
We modeled the classic task by simply identifying the time point of the ﬁrst
threshold crossing in each simulated trial and then extracting the time series
(the output of the accumulator) from 5,000 time steps before the threshold
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crossing to 500 time steps after. If the ﬁrst crossing was earlier than sample
no. 5,000 by n > 0 samples, then we padded the beginning of the epoch with
n null values (nans or “not-a-number” in MatLab). These values do not
contribute to the average across simulated trials, so the simulated average
RP becomes noisier at very early time points in the epoch. Thus, one limi-
tation of our model is that history cannot extend back earlier than the be-
ginning of the trial.
We modeled the interruptus task by selecting random interruption times
from a uniform distribution (just as we had done in the real experiment). For
each simulated trial, if the output exceeded the threshold before the
scheduled interruption, then a spontaneous-movement epoch was recorded,
as explained above. If not, thenwe added a steep linear ramp to the output at
the time of the simulated interruption. The difference between the crossing
time of the ramp and the interruption time was recorded as the simulated
reaction time.
Choice of Time Range over Which to Fit the Model Output to the RP. The dif-
ference between EEG signals contralateral and ipsilateral to the responding
limb, known as the lateralized readiness potential (LRP), has previously been
linked to awareness of movement initiation (11) and might mark the time of
a threshold-crossing event: Its amplitude does not vary with reaction time
(for cued movements) (30) and reaches a critical threshold level only when
a movement is actually made (but not when a movement is prepared and
then inhibited) (29). Thus, we apply our model to account for the signal up
until 150 ms before button press—the time of maximum (negative) slope of
the LRP in our data. This point in time also coincides with an abrupt increase
in cortico-spinal excitability at ∼100 ms before EMG onset (31) (equivalent to
∼150 ms before the button press in our experiment). We computed the LRP
as the difference between sensors C1 and C2, for right-handed subjects, or
C2 and C1, for left-handed subjects. Activity after that time is most likely
attributable to motor execution (30)—i.e., to activity that follows rather
than precedes the threshold crossing. The goodness of ﬁt did not depend
heavily on the precise time range chosen: Good ﬁts could be obtained by
placing the leading end of the model output at −200, −150, or −100 ms
(with the best ﬁt being at −100 ms). We made an a priori choice of −150 ms.
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